Landsburg method of classifying mixed Nash equilibria for maximally entangled Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens (ELW) game is analyzed with special emphasis on symmetries inherent to the problem. Nash equilibria for the original ELW game are determined.
I Introduction
The papers of Eisert, Lewenstein and Wilkens (ELW) [1] , [2] and Meyer [3] opened new field of research -the theory of quantum games [4] ÷ [52] . Roughly speaking this theory deals with the properties of the games obtained from classical ones by admitting more general correlations, in particular those which break Bell-type inequalities.
One of the most important notions of game theory is that of Nash equilibrium [53] . The famous Nash theorem states that under quite general assumptions the classical noncooperative game exhibits Nash equilibrium (or equilibria). Its validity extends to quantum domain [22] , [54] .
1 kbolonek@uni.lodz.pl 2 pkosinsk@uni.lodz.pl ELW game constructed in Ref. [1] provides a paradigm of quantum game. The natural question arises concerning the description and classification of its Nash equilibria. The most interesting case seems to be that of maximal entanglement when the initial state of the game is maximally entangled. In this case some examples of Nash equilibria were presented in Ref. [2] . In a series of nice papers [24] , [36] ÷ [39] Landsburg described the general structure of possible, in general mixed, Nash equilibria for maximally entangled ELW games. His classification is slightly involved because the problem is set in full generality, i.e. for arbitrary classical payoff matrix.
Using the isomorphism between the group SU(2) and the set of unit quaternions one can reformulate the ELW game in terms of quaternion algebra. This formalism takes a particularly simple form in the case of maximal entanglement and is extensively used in Landsburg's papers.
On the other hand it has been shown [43] that the maximally entangled ELW game is also distinguished by the existence of the real structure in the Hilbert space of the states of the game which fully determine its properties. Therefore, equivalently the game can be analyzed in terms of geometry of real fourdimensional arithmetic space.
In the present paper we classify all Nash equilibria for the original ELW game, i.e. for the particular payoff matrix used in Ref. [1] . We follow Landsburg's method with some modifications and special emphasis put on symmetries inherent in the problem. Landsburg analysis is based on two pillars. First, it is shown that any mixed strategy is equivalent to the one supported on at most four orthogonal quaternions/real fourvectors; second, the analysis of possible mixed strategies reduces to that of degeneracies of highest eigenvalues of the matrices determining the players payoffs. These two principles when combined with the symmetries of the problem give a very transparent picture.
The paper is organized as follows. I Sec. II we present the ELW game; then, in Sec. III the quaternionic formalism is introduced. Symmetries of ELW games, in particular their maximally entangled version, are discussed in Sec. IV. In the next section the Nash equilibria are introduced and Landsburg method described in more detail. In Sec. VI the Nash equilibria of the original ELW game are classified.
II The Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens quantum games (ELW games)
Eisert, Lewenstein and Wilkens [1] , [2] proposed a quantization scheme of the simplest classical symmetric noncooperative game involving two players, each having two classical strategies at his/her disposal. Let us denote the players by A (Alice) and B (Bob) while the relevant strategies are C (cooperate) and D (defect). The classical game is completely determined by the payoff matrix
where X α 's are the relevant outcomes. We will be dealing with the games which obey the conditions: (i) all X α are distinct; (ii) all twofold sums X α + X β are distinct as well; such games are called generic in Landsburg terminology [24] , [36] ÷ [39] .
The properties of both classical and quantum games depend strongly on the actual values of the outcomes. In particular, the ordering
leads to the famous Prisoner Dilemma [55] . Depending on the context the additional constraints can emerge. For example, one can add [19] 
which implies that in the iterated game the players are at least as well of playing always (C, C) or alternating between (C, D) and (D, C).
In order to construct the quantum counterpart of classical game we ascribe to each player a twodimensional complex Hilbert space H; the total space of the game is the tensor product H ⊗ H. The basic vectors in H correspond to two classical
The initial state of the game is given by
where J is the gate operator which introduces the quantum entanglement leading to quantum correlations breaking, in general, Bell-type inequalities. The form of J is determined by two conditions (i) the quantum game continues to be symmetric with respect to the exchange of players;
(ii) the classical strategies are properly represented in the quantum game.
These conditions lead to the following form of gate operator [1]
with γ ∈ 0, 
and allows us to compute Alice and Bob payoffs
The properties of the game depend on the choice of payoff matrix, the value of the parameter γ and the choice of the manifold S ⊂ SU(2) of allowed strategies.
In the original ELW paper S is some proper subset of SU(2) which itself is not a group. It seems difficult to find a justification for the use of such set of strategies [8] .
Therefore, in what follows we assume that S = SU(2), i.e. all elements of SU (2) group are admissible as Alice and Bob strategies.
The value of γ is also significant. For γ = 0 we obtain the classical game. The set of all pure quantum strategies coincides then with the set of all classical mixed ones (some parameters of SU(2) group become redundant). On the other hand,
yields maximal entanglement of initial state; the properties of the game change radically. For example, as we shall see, due to the Bell-like correlations, the quantum game lacks nontrivial pure Nash equilibria.
The payoffs of the players depend on the actual values of X α 's. However, some outcomes coincide due to the purely group-theoretical reasons. To see this let us define the stability subgroup G s ⊂ SU(2) × SU(2) of the initial state:
Using eqs. (5) and (6) it is easy to determine G s . We conclude that G s depends on the value of γ. For γ = π 2 one obtains
and g ∈ G s has the form
In the case of maximal entanglement, γ = π 2
, G s becomes, up to an isomorphism, the diagonal subgroup of SU(2) × SU(2). More precisely, any g ∈ G s has the form
i.e. G s ∼ SU(2).
Obviously, two pairs of strategies, (U A , U B ) and (U
, differing only by an element of stability subgroup,
lead to the same outcome.
We see that the maximal entanglement corresponds to the largest stability group. This fact has profound consequences for the structure of maximally entangled game [52] . To see this note the identity in SU(2) × SU(2)
Comparying eqs. (15) and (14) we conclude that the outcomes of both players depend only on the product U A U T B .
III The quaternionic formalism
It is well known that the SU (2) group is isomorphic to the group of unit quaternions.
It is, therefore, not surprising that one can formulate the ELW scheme in terms of quaternion algebra.
Let us remind shortly the notion of quaternions. One considers the fourdimensional real vector space spanned by the vectors e α , α = 0, 1, 2, 3 which may be take as orthonormal ones, (e α , e β ) = δ α,β . The multiplication law is defined as follows
extended by linearity to any pair of vectors.
(summation over α understood) one easily finds
(summations over latin indices run from 1 to 3). Quaternions form a noncommutative field with conjugation
and quaternionic norm |p|:
The quaternion is called a unit one iff |p| = 1.
Any matrix U ∈ SU(2) can be written as
The mapping
defines the group isomorphism. In particular, e k ↔ −iσ k , k = 1, 2, 3 while e 0 is 2 × 2 unit matrix.
Let us consider an ELW game defined by some parameter γ ∈ 0,
. Using the isomorphism (22) one can ascribe the quaternions p and q to the strategies of Alice and Bob, respectively,
The gate operator J, defined by eq. (6) takes the following quaternionic form
Finally, note that if we put
then, according to the definitions (4)
Eqs. (8), (9) and (23) . In the latter case the quaternionic form may be described as follows. Let
be the strategies of Alice and Bob, respectively. The Alice strategy is represented by the quaternion
which corresponds to the isomorphism (22) . On the other case, the quaternion corresponding to Bob strategy reads
This correspondence defines an isomorphism between SU(2) and unit quaternions such that
Using the above definitions it is not difficult to check that the payoff functions $ A and $ B (eqs. (8) and (9)) take the form
We see that the payoff functions take a particularly simple form in quaternionic formalism. As expected, due to the large stability group the payoffs depend only on the product pq −1 . In what follows we make the replacement q −1 → q which simplifies eqs. (34) and (35) and amounts only to relabelling the Bob strategies.
IV Symmetries of ELW games
The ELW games exhibit a number of symmetries which appear to be more or less useful when considering their specific properties. First, the structure of the game (for example, the set of Nash equilibria) does not change, except the actual values of the payoffs, if one makes the substitution
Assume now that we are dealing with maximally entangled game. Let r be any unit quaternion. Then eqs. (34) and (35) imply (with q replaced by q −1 as explained above)
In particular,
This property results, as it has been explained above, from the structure of stability group in maximally entangled case.
Another symmetry property is related to the specific geometry of quaternions [36] . It is well known that for unit quaternions p and q the transformation
describes SO(4) rotation of a four-vector r; in fact, eq. (39) defines the local isomorphism SU(2) × SU(2) ∼ SO(4). Let σ ∈ S 4 be any permutation of 0, 1, 2, 3.
Then one can always adjust the signs ± of e σ −1 (α) such that
for some unit quaternions p 1 and q 1 .
Therefore, for any quaternion r
As a result one can rewrite the expected payoff of (say) Alice as
and the same holds true for the Bob payoff $ B . We conclude that by permuting the components (pq −1 ) 2 α in eqs. (34) and (35) we obtain the equivalent games; they differ only from the initial one by relabelling the strategies only.
Both classical and quantum games are symmetric with respect to the exchange of players. This symmetry is described on the quaternionic level as follows. Let
Noting that (pq)
$ B (p, q) = $ r q r −1 , r p r
which expresses the symmetric role of both players.
V Mixed strategies and Nash equilibria
The set of all pure strategies of each player consists of unit quaternions, i.e. it forms the unit threedimensional sphere S 3 . Therefore, a mixed strategy is represented by a normalized nonnegative measure µ on S 3 . In general, both players are playing mixed strategies. Then the expected payoffs read
One of the most important notions in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium. Let us remind that a pair of strategies (µ 0 , ν 0 ) defines a Nash equilibrium iff
for all strategies µ and ν.
The problem of finding and classifying all Nash equilibria for general ELW game is nontrivial. The most interesting case seems to be the one corresponding to the maximally entangled game where the role of quntum correlations is the most significant. On the other hand the problem simplifies then due to the large symmetry of the game. In a series of papers [24] , [36] ÷ [39] , Landsburg was able to classify all potential candidates for Nash equilibria. Their general description is still quite involved but the underlying basic ideas are nice and transparent. In fact, there are two basic steps to be performed. First, one has to find the "canonical" form of mixed strategy. To this end we start with the following definitions. We call two measures on S 3 , ν and ν ′ , left equivalent iff
for any unit quaternion (and, consequently, for any quaternion) p and α = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Analogously, two measures, µ and µ ′ , are right equivalent iff
for any unit quaternion q and α = 0, 1, 2, 3.
It easy to classify all measures up to equivalence. To see this let us write
The matrix
It is easy to write out m (p) explicitly,
Eq. (53) implies now
(no summation over α). The matrix
is (a) real and symmetric; (b) positive semidefinite; (c) of unit trace. Therefore, it can be diagonalized by a real orthogonal transformation. In operator language,
and q (a) are orthonormal. Let us note that the representation (58) (56) takes the form
Eq. (59) shows that any measure ν is left equivalent to the one supported on at most four orthonormal quaternions [24] . The same holds true for right equivalence.
From the above definitions it is obvious that in computing the payoffs $ A and $ B one can replace Alice (Bob) measure by right (left) equivalent one. We conclude that the payoff functions can be always written in the form
with ρ a ≥ 0, σ a ≥ 0, Then $ A (µ, ν) is a convex combination of the quantities
. Such a convex combination acquires a maximal value iff these quantities take the same (maximal) value for all a ∈ Λ. Consider now the payoff
It is a quadratic form in p. Therefore, it takes the maximal values for p belonging to the eigenspace of the relevant quadratic matrix which corresponds to maximal eigenvalue. We conclude that the vectors p (a) , a ∈ Λ, span this eigenspace; in other words, the highest eigenvalue has |Λ|-fold degeneracy.
Similarly, let Σ ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of inidces b such that ρ b > 0. Then the eigenspace of the matrix defined by the quadratic form in q
which corresponds to the maximal eigenvalue is spanned by the vectors
Concluding, the search for Nash equilibria reduces to the problem of finding 
VI Nash equilibria for the original ELW game
We will classify now the Nash equilibria for the original ELW game [1] which corresponds to X 0 = 3, X 1 = 5, X 2 = 0, X 3 = 1.
Let us start with N = 1 case, i.e. the case Bob plays pure strategy. Due to the symmetry p → pr, q → r −1 q one can assume Bob symmetry corresponds to q = 1.
ρ a p (a) 2 α = 1. Therefore, the maximum of $ A is achieved for ρ a = 1 for some a, say a = 1, and p (1) = ±e 1 . Then $ A = 5 and Alice plays pure strategy p = e 1 . Consequently,
and the maximum is achieved for e 1 q = ±e 2 , i.e. q = ±e 3 = e 0 ; no Nash equilibrium exists.
Assume now N=2. Due to our symmetry one can assume q (1) = 1 = e 0 , q (2) = q, q = q 1 e 1 + q 2 e 2 + q 3 e 3 , q 2 = −e 0 . Denote ρ 1 = ρ, ρ 2 = 1 − ρ, 0 < ρ < 1. We find
Let X = diag (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ); moreover, we put (cf. eq. (53))
Then 
According to the discussion of previous Section the matrix
posseses M-fold (M ≥ 2) degenerate highest eigenvalue.
Y (q, ρ, X) is a real symmetric matrix; explicitly
where X αβ ≡ X α − X β and
(71)
(72)
(73)
Assume first that only one component of q is nonzero. Then the matrix
Using the actual values of the payoffs X α we find easily that the highest eigenvalue is degenerated only provided ρ = 1 2
. Then the eigenspace corresponding to the maximal eigenvalues is spanned by e 1 and e 2 . Therefore, according to the general discussion presented above, Alice plays the strategies
with the probabilities σ and (1 − σ), respectively. Then the quadratic matrix defining the Bob payoff reads
where c ≡ cos θ, s ≡ sin θ and
Now, q = e 0 should be an eigenvector corresponding to the highest eigenvalue. This
we find double degeneracy of highest eigenvalue corresponding to q (1) = e 0 , q (3) = ±e 3 . Therefore, we find the whole family of Nash equilibria parametrized by an angle θ:
Alice:
The strategies
played with the probabilities
played with the probabilities The case N = 2 with at least two nonvanishing components of q is more involved. let T (α) ⊂ R 4 be the subspace defined by the relations
where the matrix Y (q, ρ, X) is given by eq. (70). Under our assumption concerning q the spaces T (α) are twodimensional for α = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Defining
we easily find that
that the highest eigenvalue of Y (q, ρ, X) is at least doubly degenerated. Then there exists an eigenvector w of Y (q, ρ, X) which obeys (say) w 0 = 0,
Eq. (91) implies that w ∈ T (0) . By virtue of this one can write
Inserting the general form of w, as given by eq. (92) there is a one parameter family of solutions q 2 = q 2 (ρ),
. Denoting again byp (1) and p (2) the eigenvectors of Y (q, ρ, X) corresponding to the largest eigenvalue we find that the Alice strategy is
played with the probabilities σ and (1 − σ), respectively. Now, we demand that the Bob payoff maximizes on e 0 and q. There are three free parameters to be determined: θ, σ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ 
Note that then yields Y (q, ρ, X) = λI which implies that only one component of q is nonvanishing.
Finally, consider the case N ≥ 3. One can again write out the relevant matrices Y and Z and derive the conditions to be fulfield in order they posses at least threefold degenerate maximal highest eigenvalues. However, it is more convenient to use directly the results derived by Landsburg [37] which take particularly simple form when M ≥ N ≥ 3. Namely, there are two possibilities: either (i) each players strategy is supported on three of the four strategies ±e 0 , ±e 1 , ±e 2 , ±e 3 or
(ii) each player plays each of four orthogonal quaternions with probability 1 4 . It is straightforward to check that for the actual values of payoffs X α the case (i) leads to no Nash equilibria. As far as (ii) is concerned, the O(4) degeneracy allows us to assume that both player play strategies supported on e 0 , e 1 , e 2 and e 3 . Again no Nash equilibrium is attained.
VII Explicit form of Nash equilibria
The following conclusion follows from the results derived in previous sections. All Nash equilibria for the original maximally entangled ELW game are obtained from the following strategies of Alice and Bob
Alice: e 1 and e 2 played with equal probabilities
Bob:
e 0 and e 3 played with equal probabilities, by applying the following operations:
(i) O(2) transformations on (e 1 , e 2 ) and (e 0 , e 3 )
(ii) symmetry transformations p → pr, q → r −1 q with r being an arbitrary unit quaternion.
As a result we obtain the following family of strategies:
(e 1 cos θ A + e 2 sin θ A ) r, ± (−e 1 sin θ A + e 2 cos θ A ) r played with equal probabilities Bob: r −1 (e 0 cos θ B + e 3 sin θ B ), ±r −1 (−e 0 sin θ B + e 3 cos θ B ) played with equal probabilities.
One can get rid of θ B dependence by factorizing an arbitrary r as r(θ B ) · r with r(θ B ) = e 0 cos θ B + e 3 sin θ B .
Finally, we arrive at the following form of strategies:
(e 1 cos θ + e 2 sin θ) r, ± (−e 1 sin θ + e 2 cos θ) r
Bob:
r −1 e 0 , ±r −1 e 3 played with equal probabilities.
Let us translate our result back to the language of SU(2) matrices. Taking into account eqs. (31) and (32) and keeping in mind that we have made the replacement Q → q −1 we find the following form of Nash strategies:
Alice: 
all strategies being played with probability Let us note that the substitution
exchanges the roles of Alice and Bob. Puting α = 0, β = 1 and θ = π yields the Nash equilibrium considered in Ref. [2] .
